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BOOK REVIEW
Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts,
Creators: New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham,
U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2010)
Teresa Scassa*
In Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules,1 Giuseppina
D’Agostino makes an important contribution to the scholarly literature on copy-
right law. In an age where so many works about copyright focus on the relationship
between creators and users of protected works,2 D’Agostino’s book offers a re-
freshing change of perspective. She chooses to explore the no less important and
often fraught relationship between publishers and authors, and she does so in the
context of freelance authors who contribute to print publications. While the primary
focus of the book is on U.K. law, it is a comparative work, and offers an analysis of
developments in Canada, the U.S. and continental Europe as well. This accessible
and engaging book is likely to be of interest to authors and publishers, to practising
lawyers, and to academics and students of law.
The plight of the freelance author has been brought to the forefront of copy-
right consciousness by high profile decisions in both the U.S. and Canada that con-
sidered the scope of freelance authors’ licences with major newspapers to publish
the works in which the authors had retained copyright. Both New York Times Co. v.
Tasini3 in the U.S. and Robertson v. Thomson Corp.4 in Canada involved disputes
over whether the publishers, having obtained licences to publish the works in their
print publications, were merely exercising their rights in their collective works
when they reproduced the articles in electronic databases. D’Agostino critically
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1 Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules,
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2010).
2 The Supreme Court of Canada characterizes the balance sought to be achieved in copy-
right law as that between creators and society (Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain inc. c.
Théberge, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 at para. 30) This is recast in CCH
Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 SCR 339 at
para. 48 as a balance between creators and users. This is not by any means the only
relationship of importance in copyright law, but it is the one which has been the focus
of a great deal of contemporary scholarly writing.
3 533 US 483, 121 S Ct 2381 (2001).
4 2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 SCR 363.
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considers both of these cases, and situates these decisions within a careful and
thoughtful exploration of the relationship between authors and publishers under
copyright law. She considers the history of this relationship, and the evolution of
contemporary copyright legislation in the U.K., Canada and continental Europe.
D’Agostino describes her book as one which “evaluates the adequacy of copyright
law to address the exploitation of freelance authors’ works in the digital era.”5 She
offers a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the lacunae in the legislation and, the
power dynamics at play both in the drafting and reform of laws and in the negotiat-
ing of contracts. She ultimately proposes a range of solutions aimed to repair what
she considers to be a fundamental lack of equilibrium in this area of law. Her ap-
proach is comparative, and takes into account law and litigation in the U.K., U.S.,
Canada and continental Europe.
D’Agostino is a professor at the Osgoode Hall Law School, where she is also
the Founding Director of IP Osgoode, a centre for IP research and teaching. In her
focus on author’s rights, she has carved out for herself a distinct intellectual space
in the Canadian IP academy which has tended towards an exploration of users’
rights in copyright law. D’Agostino expressly situates herself outside of other con-
ventional debates as well. She describes two scholarly camps: one which maintains
that copyright can no longer serve the needs of contemporary society, and one
which argues that existing laws can be adapted to meet those same needs. In not
aligning herself with either camp, D’Agostino explains that: “Copyright law can
and should cope, but it should by no means do so alone: government, industry play-
ers, authors and publishers’ groups, and collecting societies must cooperate in
reconfiguring the copyright system.”6 Indeed this pluralistic vision of copyright re-
form is reflected in her exposition of how to resolve the failings of copyright in the
relationship between authors and publishers.
D’Agostino begins with an exploration of the copyright issues facing freelanc-
ers in an era of digital publication. The discussion takes into account the growing
globalization of the publishing industry, as well as the increasing concentration of
ownership in the hands of a few major publishing companies. She notes that “[t]he
convergence in the structure of publishing from the small to large media conglom-
erates has affected the type of contractual arrangements between publisher and au-
thor and, in turn, the quality and diversity of publishing.”7 Analogizing freelance
authors to sweatshop workers, D’Agostino explores the economics of freelance au-
thorship as well as the revenue generation practices of newspapers and magazines.
The discussion highlights the growing imbalance in bargaining power between in-
dividuals; contractual terms are increasingly dictated by publishers who seek to ob-
tain rights for future and unspecified formats and markets. D’Agostino also re-
counts instances of retaliation against freelance authors who have attempted to
assert their rights or to dispute contractual terms.
D’Agostino provides an engaging account of the history of copyright law from
the perspective of the freelance author, as well as an account of the history of the
copyright contract in relation to the freelancer. In this respect her work is again
5 D’Agostino, supra note 1 at 5.
6 Ibid at 11.
7 Ibid at 21.
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notable. Unlike many other works that focus largely on the terms of copyright leg-
islation in exploring copyright issues, D’Agostino includes a study of the history,
practices, and jurisprudence relating to copyright contracts. She considers judicial
approaches to the contractual relationship between author and publisher at common
law, in equity, and even in the context of the bankruptcy of a publisher. Her per-
spective is clear: the lacunae in the law can best be understood by considering how
contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power consistently exploit the law
to favour the stronger party. Indeed, her account reveals that courts have often been
sensitive to this imbalance of power, and she documents a solid history of case law
that interprets ambiguities in contractual terms in favour of the author. Her broader
argument, supported by this case law, is that any reforms must be understood in
light of what is needed to protect vulnerable authors from undue exploitation.
D’Agostino’s critique of copyright law — both domestic legislation and inter-
national conventions — is that it is ultimately pro-publisher rather than pro-author
because of the extensive space it creates for private bargains. Of the Berne Conven-
tion,8 she writes that its “long-drawn out history shows a persistent preoccupation
in ensuring authors’ freedom to contract.”9 She is equally critical of the lack of
genuine consideration for authors in other international conventions, though she
notes that TRIPS,10 at least, is quite explicit in its trade-oriented aspirations. Of the
WCT11 she laments that “[m]eant to usher copyright into the digital era, it does so
primarily for industry by providing a framework for states to enact digital and tech-
nical protection measures.”12
Indeed, this analysis of copyright laws and international treaties supports
D’Agostino’s historical analysis which shows the emergence and development of
copyright law as a vehicle to protect industry interests. The author, placed notion-
ally at the centre of emerging copyright legislation, is merely a convenient stepping
stone to the concentration of rights acquired by contract by industry players. In this
reality, D’Agostino’s arguments to strengthen the hand of authors seeks to restore
at least some of the stated ambitions of copyright law as legislation about the rights
of authors.
Perhaps not surprisingly, D’Agostino finds that civil law jurisdictions have
tended to be more favourable towards the protection of authors. Indeed, it is part of
copyright dogma that civil law jurisdictions embrace a natural rights view of copy-
right as inhering to the author,13 and combine strong moral rights protection in
tandem with economic rights. In the case of freelance authors, she notes that many
8 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886,
828 UNTS 221.
9 D’Agostino, supra note 1 at 98.
10 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 C: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299,
online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm>.
11 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65 at Art 5 (entered into force 6
March 2002), online: <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html>.
12 D’Agostino, supra note 1 at 111.
13 See, for example, the exposition of this view by Justice Binnie of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Théberge, supra note 2 at 367.
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civil law countries include legislative provisions regarding “transfers of economic
and moral rights, transfers of future rights, reversion, contract formation and inter-
pretation rules, special provisions and collective licencing.”14 She notes in particu-
lar provisions that require, in the case of ambiguity in licences and assignments,
that these contracts should be interpreted in the author’s favour.15 By contrast,
common law jurisdictions are silent as to the dynamics of contracting. In this re-
gard, globalization has another impact. The digital era in publishing gives rise to an
increasing number of private international law issues. D’Agostino notes that differ-
ences across national copyright laws can mean that the rights of an author may vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In this context, contracts dictated by publishers
will contain choice of law clauses that favour publishers’ interests.
The cases of Tasini and Robertson offer clear illustrations of the conflicts be-
tween authors and publishers in the digital age. D’Agostino offers a discussion and
critique of these decisions, as well as an analysis of their aftermath and the ongoing
disputes spawned by both cases. In both cases, publishers argued that although their
contracts with freelancers were silent as to the publication of works in the new
media, the electronic publication of the contents of their newspapers was an exer-
cise of their rights in copyright law to publish these collective works. D’Agostino is
critical of both the U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts for avoiding key contracting
issues between the parties, and instead focussing their analysis on the interpretation
of the copyright legislation in each jurisdiction. Although the freelancers won no-
tional victories in each case, without some means of addressing their inequality of
bargaining power, the victories are largely pyrrhic. Indeed, D’Agostino notes that
in Robertson, the majority of the Court confirmed that “[p]arties are, have been,
and will continue to be free, to alter by contract the rights established by the Copy-
right Act.”16 D’Agostino describes this as “a strong pronouncement on the persist-
ing power of freedom of contract to trump any statutory-based right.”17 She notes
that the post-Tasini use of standardized contracts in the industry to arrogate to pub-
lishers all digital rights cannot be seen simply as an exercise in freedom of contract.
From a policy perspective, however, it represents a fundamental shift in balance
that she argues should be countered in the legislation.
Similar litigation in continental Europe offers what D’Agostino considers to
be useful precedents in considering an alternate approach to such issues. She notes
that legislation in many continental European countries is less vague on key issues
around the interpretation of contracts, and as a result, the court rulings are “more
attuned to freelancers’ disadvantages.”18 She remains critical, however, of the fore-
seeability principle applied by these courts. Courts applying this principle consider
the extent to which a new medium for the exploitation of works that is not explic-
14 D’Agostino, supra note 1 at 122.
15 Ibid at 125-126. D’Agostino references the work by L. Guibault and B. Hugenholtz,
Study on the Conditions Applicable to Contracts Relating to Intellectual Property in
the European Union — Final Report (Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, May
2002).
16 D’Agostino, supra note 1 at 158, citing Robertson, supra note 4 at para. 58.
17 D’Agostino, supra note 1 at 158.
18 Ibid at 164.
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itly addressed in the contract was foreseeable at the time of contracting.
D’Agostino argues that the principle introduces unpredictability and uncertainty
into the equation, particularly as there is bound to be debate over the extent to
which a particular technology or medium was “foreseeable” at any point in time,
and there may be distinctions between a foreseeable technology and foreseeable
commercial applications for that technology. She notes that something like a fore-
seeability principle may be creeping into North American jurisprudence, and she
cautions that this principle relies too much on questionable assumptions about free-
lancers’ bargaining position.
D’Agostino devotes a chapter to the state of law and practice in the U.K. At
the time of writing, she notes, there was no litigation equivalent in scope to Tasini
or Robertson, although some settlements of disputes had been reached with major
newspapers, suggesting that the same issues are alive and well in the U.K. In this
chapter she considers how a comparable case in the U.K. might be decided, with
the U.K. presenting an interesting blend of continental and common law principles.
She notes that this, combined with the contract law jurisprudence discussed earlier,
and which tends to favour authors in cases of ambiguity, leaves her cautiously opti-
mistic about the outcome of any such litigation. However, she notes here, as else-
where, that the costs of litigation are too high to be borne by many authors, and
these costs, combined with the risks and uncertainty make it an inferior option to
addressing the issues in the context of law reform.
To this end, the final two chapters of the book attempt to arrive at a set of
solutions to the difficulties expounded upon in the preceding chapters. Chapter 10
explores the role of theory in justifying or supporting particular positions.
D’Agostino demonstrates that both natural law and economic theories can be used
to support the arguments of either publishers or freelancers. She introduces into her
analysis Marxist theory, arguing that the Marxist focus on imbalance in power rela-
tions is crucially important. She argues that “the Marxist lens not only exposes the
copyright industry as one largely favouring capitalist publishers, but also exposes
the difficulties in crafting solutions especially (and solely) via copyright.”19
Indeed, in crafting her solutions to the problem d’Agostino takes a holistic
approach that considers the many different ways that law and policy can play a role
in reform. First, she would see changes to copyright legislation to resolve issues of
ambiguity in interpreting contracts of assignment or licence in favour of authors.
She also proposes sui generis legislation governing freelance authors, that would
take into account the particular dynamics and realities of that industry. She argues
for these changes to be reflected at the national, regional and international levels.
Beyond the reform of laws and treaties, D’Agostino would also argue for ap-
proaches to judicial interpretation of contracts that would take into account the une-
qual bargaining power of freelancers. In her view, this is consistent with a long
history of British case law interpreting such contracts. She advocates as well for the
use of other possible tools, including voluntary codes or best practices for the in-
dustry, and model agreements. She proposes a grievance board, which would offer
a much lower cost and more efficacious means of settling disputes. She sees a po-
tential role, as well, for collective societies, and for a restructuring of payments for
19 Ibid at 248.
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freelance work from a simple lump sum to some combination of a lump sum and
royalties. Finally, she advocates for educational initiatives as a means of better in-
forming freelancers as to their rights and alternatives.
Copyright, Contracts and Creators is a well written book that offers some
much needed insight into a relationship that is often ignored in copyright scholar-
ship. By shifting the frame of analysis from owner-user to author-publisher,
D’Agostino introduces fresh ideas and perspectives into the debate around copy-
right reform. Her work is also refreshing for its blending of doctrinal copyright
analysis with contract law. D’Agostino negotiates the gap between what the law
permits and what industry dictates. In doing so, she offers clear and important in-
sights into how lawmakers — and the courts — should tackle the public policy is-
sues inherent in the unequal relationships enabled by copyright law.
